by Maria Odete Madeira
Nihilum or Nothing is a referential expression that signals the non-existence of all the things.
The Nothing is understood in its relation with the Being: the Being is and the Nothing is-not; the Being is the Being, because the Being is, and the Nothing is the Not-Being because the Nothing is-not.
However, the Nothing is also Being, because the Nothing is the Nothing, that is, the Nothing is the Being of the Not-Being.
Every referential expression resends towards a referent. The referential expression Nothing resends towards a referent: the Being of all the things.
In any language the referent can be defined as an object of perception. In the referential expression Nothing, the referent is the Being itself that, as such, has the power of generating its own negation: the Not-Being of the Being, understood as a non-presence and, in this way, as a non-existence.
Parmenides introduced, in the Western thinking, the concept of eternity as total presence of the Being. In accordance with Parmenides, the Being exists as total presence, the Being is not born nor dies, the Being is and exists as an eternal present.
However, the Not of the negation imposed itself on the human thinking and language as a power of the Being, as capability of displacing oneself, in a strange loop, from the Being to the Not-Being, in the same flow of Being, as total presence, and, thus, simultaneous, coincident and permanent rotativity of oneself, in oneself and for oneself.
Heidegger experienced, through a feeling of anguish, the interval of thinking between the Being and the Entity. It is dived in a profound anguish that the author conjectures that the entities are not the Being and that the truth of the entities is in that which they are not: the Being itself.
For Heidegger, in front of the Being, the man is helpless, lost in the Nothing. Because the Being, itself, is neither this nor that: the Being, itself, is Nothing.
23 hours ago
1 comment:
For Heiddegar access to the meaning of being was obtained by thrusting aside one's interpretive tendencies. For Sartre the meaning of being was obtained by the modifying nihilation of the for-itself from the in-itself aka the introduction of nothingness into being. It seems to me that such a nihilation is an interpretive tendency which, when ceased, actually in ones historicity, allows full access to the meaning of being. I therefore do not believe that nothingness (except in the sense of not- thingness) is central to Heiddeger's ontology. I think instead that his ontology requires the removal of nihilation and the resulting standing and enduring of the plenitude of being unmolested so to speak.
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